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Abstract
We develop a theory of self-regulation based on goal setting for an agent with
present-biased preferences. Preferences are assumed to be reference-dependent
and exhibit loss aversion, as in prospect theory. The reference point is deter-
mined endogenously as an optimal self-sustaining goal. The interaction between
hyperbolic discounting and loss aversion makes goals a credible and eﬀective
instrument for self-regulation. This is an entirely internal commitment device
that does not rely on reputation building. We show that in some cases it
is optimal to engage in indulgent behavior, and sometimes it is optimal to set
seemingly dysfunctional goals. Finally, we derive a condition under which prox-
imal (short term) goals are better than distal (long term) goals. Our results
provide an implicit evolutionary rationale for the existence of loss aversion as
a means of self-control.
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1 Introduction
It is a prevalent idea in psychology that goals helps to motivate oneself and increase
persistence (Locke and Latham, 1990; Heath et al., 1999). Simplifying, the principal
claim in that literature is that a person who plans to run 5 miles in the park will
run 5 miles and then stop, while if that same person had set the more ambitious
goal for herself to run 10 miles, she would not stop until she made it to the 10 miles
mark. Such personal goals, without incentives imposed by others, have been largely
neglected in the economics literature. The reason is simple: based on the rational
paradigm, with its focus on optimal choices and the usual neglect of self-control and
self-regulation issues, economics makes no diﬀerence between a personal "goal" and
a "strategy" or "decision".
In the realm of intrapersonal conflicts, goals can have substance. We show that
goals can be part of self-regulation strategies: one of the intrapersonal "selves" can
set goals for other selves. Understanding the mechanisms that may induce fulfillment
of these goals despite the divergence of preferences then becomes an interesting and
important topic. This provides an alternative to other self-regulation mechanisms
discussed in the literature, such as external commitments (e.g. using illiquid assets
(Laibson (1997))), internal commitments and personal rules (Bénabou and Tirole
(2004)), manipulation of self-confidence and self-esteem (Carrillo and Mariotti (2000),
Bénabou and Tirole (2003)). The mechanism of goalsetting diﬀers in that it works
as an internal commitment device that does not rely on reputation building.
One objective of this paper is to investigate goal setting in a formal game-theoretic
model that allows to evaluate some trade-oﬀs that arise when one chooses more or
less ambitious goals. A central element of our model is time inconsistency. Many
studies suggest that people become less patient when payoﬀs are nearby in the future.1
Impatience leads to temptations to spend savings, to procrastinate important but
unpleasant tasks, to deviate from a diet, etc. By setting goals for the future, the
person’s current self can try to control the behavior of her subsequent incarnations.
A central issue is of course the credibility of such goals, which can be considered
1See, e.g., a survey in Frederick et al. (2002).
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as a constraint imposed by rationality. In this paper we show that the presence of loss
aversion can ensure credibility of goals and make them an eﬀective instrument of self-
regulation.2 Having established this, we then derive some features of goals that are
of central interest in the psychology literature. In particular, we show that (1) self-
control can be further enhanced by (ex ante) costly self-rewards or ’indulgence’; (2)
goals can be dysfunctional in some circumstances; and (3) rigid ’proximal’ short-term
goals can be better than more flexible ’distal’ long-term goals.
The second objective of this paper is to give an implicit evolutionary argument
for the possible origins of loss aversion. Indeed, loss aversion seems a dysfunctional
feature of human preferences: in many situations it leads to lower materials payoﬀs,
or, using evolutionary terminology, lower "fitness". One might then ask why people
would be endowed with such preferences. A recent thriving literature investigates the
origins of our preferences.3 Such evolutionary models can generate the formation of
intertemporal preferences with hyperbolic discounting: Dasgupta and Maskin (2005)
and Samuelson and Swinkels (2006) show that such preferences can be evolutionarily
optimal in the presence of uncertainty. In contrast, we are not aware of the literature
where the formation of preferences exhibiting loss aversion is given an evolutionary
argument, and our paper makes a step in this direction.4 We show that some degree
of loss aversion can be beneficial for mitigating self-control problems.
In our model, a person with present-biased preferences forms beliefs (i.e. sets a
goal) at date 0 whether or not to exert eﬀort on a task at date 1. Exerting eﬀort
implies immediate costs in terms of disutility, and yields a delayed reward at date 2.
From an ex ante (date 0) perspective, the person is better oﬀ undertaking the task,
but the bias towards the present implies that when the actual eﬀort decision has to
be made (date 1), the person is tempted to withdraw from the goal set and exert no
eﬀort.
Setting a high-eﬀort-high-reward goal may not be feasible if the present bias is
2Relatedly, in a recent paper Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2008) show that loss aversion can help to make
optimal consumption plans credible.
3See Robson (2001) and Robson (2002) for reviews.
4See, however, Brunnermeier (2004) for foundations of prospect theory based on bounded ratio-
nality.
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strong enough. Loss aversion, however, makes it more costly for date-1 self to deviate
from an ambitious goal since this would imply a loss with respect to the expected
date-2 reward, and this loss "looms larger" than the gain in terms of saved date-1 cost
of eﬀort. Loss aversion is thus able to counteract the tendency to shirk arising due
to impatience. On the other hand, with loss aversion there are ranges of parameters
for which there are multiple equilibria, including ’bad’ equilibria, in which the person
sets low self-sustaining expectations. In this case, she will not exert eﬀort even if
eﬀort is optimal from both self-0 and self-1’s point of view in the absence of loss
aversion. However, since we interpret the reference point as the goal deliberately set
by the person, we mostly focus on optimal goals.
By showing how goals can mitigate self-control problems, our model provides an
explanation for the apparent wide use of personal goals. Our results show why and
when goal setting can be eﬀective. In our framework, it is the interaction between
loss aversion and hyperbolic discounting that creates demand for goal setting and
makes it an eﬀective strategy. Neither loss aversion nor hyperbolic discounting by
themselves are suﬃcient to generate nontrivial impact of goals on motivation. We
show that the set of parameters such that eﬀective goal setting is possible expands
with growing severeness of both loss aversion and hyperbolic discounting. In the basic
model without uncertainty, goal setting allows to achieve, for a range of parameters,
ex ante optimal (first best) behavior, infeasible in the absence of loss aversion.
We then extend the basic model and show that eﬀective goal setting can be ex-
panded further by providing rewards to oneself contingent on completing the task.
We show, however, that these rewards have to be costly from an ex-ante point of
view. This is reminiscent of indulgent behavior: treating oneself on a good bottle of
St. Emilion wine after finishing a paper, a bottle that would otherwise be considered
as too extravagant.
Then, uncertainty about disutility of eﬀort is introduced in our model. We show
that loss aversion creates overly rigid ("compulsive") goals. For some parameters, the
person optimally chooses to always (never) work even though costs may be higher
(lower) than benefits from every period’s perspective. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) get
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a similar result in a diﬀerent context, and we extend it to a context with hyperbolic
discounting and discuss the interplay between loss aversion and hyperbolic discount-
ing.
Finally, we extend the model to the case where a task requires two units of eﬀort,
to be completed over the course of two periods. We analyze the trade-oﬀ between
proximal and distal goals, and show that the optimal type of goals depends on the
correlation of costs shocks over the two periods. In particular, proximal goals are
preferred when costs are positively correlated over time, but may be worse under
negative correlation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews some relevant lit-
erature. Section 3 presents the basic model and analyzes optimal goals. Section 4
extends the analysis to self rewards and indulgence. Uncertainty is introduced in
section 5, and proximal and distal goals in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
Our model rests on a few key ingredients (time inconsistency, loss aversion, reference
point), and we briefly review the relevant literature in this section, and that of goal
setting.
Time inconsistency The first premise is that people tend to procrastinate, or more
generally that they have problems of self-control. This is a widely held belief, and an
emerging literature provides abundant evidence of this. The most documented mani-
festation is a declining rate of time preferences: subjects at the same time prefer $100
now to $110 tomorrow, and $110 in 31 days to $100 in 30 days (see e.g. the extensive
review by Frederick et al. (2002)). Among more recent contributions, Benhabib et al.
(2007), for instance, reject exponential discounting in their experiments, and support
the presence of a present bias. Relatedly, in experiments reported in Burger et al.
(2008), participants had to complete 75 hours of studying over a 5 week period. Many
participants delayed studying towards the last few weeks, although there was much
heterogeneity among participants in this respect..
Most models of time inconsistent behavior predict that people could benefit from
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commitments, and would even be willing to pay for the opportunity to commit. Ariely
and Wertenbroch (2002) find that students do better with more strict deadlines, and
when given the opportunity many students self impose costly deadlines. Such a
demand for commitment is also found by Bernatzi and Thaler (2004) and by Ashraf
et al. (2004) for the case of savings.
Time inconsistent behavior can be interpreted in several ways, such as a conflict
between consecutive selves as in models with quasi-hyperbolic discounting (e.g. Strotz
(1955), Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)) or a conflict between a long-
run self and a sequence of myopic short-run selves as in "dual-self" models (e.g.
Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Fudenberg and Levine (2006)). We follow the approach of
quasi-hyperbolic discounting, which allows to capture time inconsistency in a concise
and tractable way, even though it may not be completely accurate.5
Reference point One of the main elements of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979)
prospect theory is the reference point. In prospect theory preferences are defined not
over final outcomes, but depend on their comparison with a preset reference point.
Prospect theory, on which we base our model, is incomplete in that it does not explain
how a key element — the reference point — is determined. In this paper we assume as
Heath et al. (1999) do, that goals set by the person herself serve as future reference
points. However, Heath et al. (1999) disregard the constraints that are naturally
imposed by a requirement that the goals set be credible (they also do not consider
self-control problems). In contrast, we follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) and assume
that the goal — the reference point — corresponds to rational expectations about the
future behavior. Although people do systematically deviate from goals they set for
themselves, we believe that goals cannot be set arbitrarily and assuming that they
be realistic forecasts is a natural, although somewhat exaggerated, benchmark.
Loss aversion Loss aversion, another key component of prospect theory, refers to
the tendency of people to feel losses (with respect to the reference point) stronger
than same-size gains: in the words of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ‘losses loom
5See, however, Rubinstein (2003) for a critique of this approach. Benhabib et al. (2007) also find
no evidence supporting this specific form. Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) find that many anomalies
can in fact be explained in a framework where people have preferences over sets of lotteries.
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larger than gains’. Loss aversion is demonstrated in many empirical studies (see
Kahneman and Tversky (2000)). It is put forward as an explanation of diﬀerent types
of preference reversals observed in the lab (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1991)) and of
the endowment eﬀect observed both in the lab and in the field6. Loss aversion may also
account for the disposition eﬀect observed among individual investors — a tendency
to sell winners too soon and to hold on to losers for too long (Odean, 1998). Such
phenomena seem to lower payoﬀs. In a theoretical model Shalev (2002) also shows
that stronger loss aversion leads to a lower share of the pie a player gets in a (à la
Nash) bargaining game. Besides, loss aversion is associated with lower IQ (Frederick,
2005) and it evaporates as the experience of market interactions accumulates (List,
2003).
Goal setting There is a literature in psychology that upholds the belief that goals
have an impact on motivation and thereby performance, even if they are not accom-
panied by extrinsic incentives such as bonuses, piece rates, or threats of sanctions.
They argue that by merely changing the goal, motivation can be improved. Locke
and Latham (1991) survey over 200 studies in their authoritative and voluminous
book. Heath et al. (1999, p. 81) summarize this literature as follows: "performance
increases have been documented using tasks ranging from cognitive, such as solving
anagrams or thinking of creative uses for a common household object, to physical,
such as cutting logs and pedaling a bicycle".
In the typical experiment, some individuals are assigned an easy task and others
a more challenging task. For instance, Matsui et al. (1981) asked subjects to detect
discrepancies between two lists of three digit numbers. Those assigned to an easy
goal perform on average significantly worse than those assigned the more challenging
goal. Hence, the mere suggestion of a more challenging goal improved performance.
While the volume of the empirical literature on goal setting is impressive, un-
derstanding of mechanisms through which goals aﬀect behavior seems to be lagging
behind. More knowledge is needed on when and why personal goals are eﬀective. A
6The endowment eﬀect (Thaler (1980)) is a general tendency of people to value goods they
have more than similar goods they do not have. It has been demonstrated in many lab and field
experiments (e.g. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), List (2003, 2004)), but its generality and
robustnest are not indisputable (e.g. List (2003, 2004), Plott and Zeiler (2005)).
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diﬃculty in interpreting the experimental results also stems from the fact that per-
sonal goals are hard to observe, and in many experiments the manipulation of personal
goals may have been confounded with changes in other factors. For instance, subjects
may simply feel they should adhere to the authority of the experimenter. Given this
lack of structured approach, we believe that our paper contributes to understand-
ing of the mechanisms which make personal goals credible and eﬀective in changing
behavior, and suggests a framework to evaluate diﬀerent types of goals from both a
positive and a normative perspective.
3 The basic model
Consider an agent that is facing a task. Completing the task requires eﬀort, e, and
disutility of eﬀort is given by c(e). A successfully completed task yields a payoﬀ v(e).
For simplicity, we assume that eﬀort is a binary decision: e ∈ {0, 1}. We normalize
c(0) = 0 and c(1) = c, and similarly v(0) = 0 and v(1) = v. We also assume that
c < v.
There are three periods, t = 0, 1, 2. At t = 1 the agent chooses eﬀort and incurs
the corresponding cost. The reward for the task is received at t = 2. Preceding
these two periods, there is a goal-setting stage at t = 0 in which the agent forms
expectations about eﬀort and the corresponding reward. The goal set by the agent
reflects the belief that the task will be undertaken. We allow for stochastic goals: the
agent may plan to play a mixed strategy at t = 1. We denote the goal set at t = 0 as
σ˜ = (σ˜0, σ˜1) with σ˜0+ σ˜1 = 1; σ˜1 is the belief that eﬀort will be exerted at t = 1 and
σ˜0 is the belief that no eﬀort will be exerted at t = 1. We assume that the set goal
cannot be adjusted at later dates.
Let ut be the agent’s instantaneous utility at time t. Instantaneous utility has
two components. The first component, mt(e), is standard utility, consisting of direct
payoﬀs received at time t: the disutility of eﬀort m1(1) = −c and m1(0) = 0, and
reward for the task m2(1) = v and m2(0) = 0. The second component is reference
dependent. It consists of the received payoﬀs as compared to the realizations of
the reference point, where the reference point is determined by the goal set: for a
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deterministic goal e˜ the reference point is (m1(e˜),m2(e˜)); for a stochastic goal the
reference point is a respective lottery. We denote by σ = (σ0, σ1) the mixed strategy
in period 1 that assigns probability σi to pure strategy e = i. We assume that ut
takes the following expected utility form, adopting the framework by Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006)7:
ut(σ|σ˜) =
X
e=0,1
σe
X
e˜=0,1
σ˜e˜ [mt(e) + μ(mt(e)−mt(e˜))] ,
where
μ(x) =
½
ηx if x > 0,
ηλx if x ≤ 0
is the component of the utility function reflecting its reference-dependent nature.
The parameter η ≥ 0 reflects the weight attached to the reference point component,
and λ ≥ 1 reflects the degree of loss aversion. Note, in particular, that payoﬀs are
evaluated against each possible realization of the stochastic reference point.
Let Ut the agent’s intertemporal (expected) utility function from the perspective
of time t. We consider a quasi-hyperbolic intertemporal utility function of the (β, δ)−
form8:
Ut = δ
tut + β
2X
τ=t+1
δτuτ
where 0 < β ≤ 1 and, without loss, we set δ = 1 for simplicity. Hence, all future
payoﬀs are discounted at rate β.
To close the model we need to make some additional assumptions on how goals
are set. First of all we assume that goals are self-sustaining: the person has rational
expectations about her actual behavior. Second, we assume that the goal set at t = 0
maximizes intertemporal utility Uo — the person chooses the optimal self-sustaining
goal.9
7This specification with a piecewise-linear reference-dependent term is a special case of Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006). They also consider this special case in some applications.
8See Phelps and Pollak (1968), Laibson (1997), Rabin and O’Donoghue(1999).
9Self-sustaining goals correspond to Personal Equilibria (PE) of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), while
optimal self-sustaining goals correspond to their Preferred Personal Equilibria.
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Definition 1 (i) Goal σ˜ is self-sustaining if U1(σ˜|σ˜) ≥ U1(σ0|σ˜) for any σ0.
(ii) Self-sustaining goal σ˜ is optimal, if U0(σ˜|σ˜) ≥ U0(σ0|σ0) for any other self-
sustaining goal σ0.
Our main interest is in the cases where the goal set at t = 0 has a nontrivial
impact on the behavior at t = 1. We say that goal setting is eﬀective if the optimal
self-sustaining goal from t = 0 perspective is diﬀerent from the optimal goal from
t = 1 perspective. If, on the other hand, the agent’s optimum goal is the same from
the perspective of t = 1 and t = 0, or if they are diﬀerent but t = 1-optimal goal is
not self-sustaining, the goal setting does not have impact on behavior.
3.1 The choice of eﬀort with exogenous goals
We first analyze the agent’s behavior at date 1 given any goal. Suppose the agent’s
goal is to exert eﬀort with probability q, i.e. σ˜ = (1 − q, q). This means that with
probability q the agent expects a reference point (−c(1), v(1)) = (−c, v), and with
probability 1 − q the agent expects a reference point (−c(0), v(0)) = (0, 0). If the
agents exerts eﬀort, the utility evaluated at t = 1 is then given by:
−c− (1− q)ηλc+ βv + (1− q)βηv. (1)
Eﬀort yields a direct payoﬀ equal to −c+ βv. With probability q eﬀort is expected,
and exerting eﬀort therefore coincides with the reference point. With probability 1−q
no eﬀort is expected. In that case, the disutility of eﬀorts is a loss relative to the
reference point, and the reward is a gain compared to the reference point. Similarly,
the utility from not exerting eﬀort is given by:
qηc− qβηλv. (2)
There is no direct payoﬀ in this case. With probability 1 − q no eﬀort is expected
and there is no gain or loss relative to the reference point. With probability q, eﬀort
is expected and saving disutility of eﬀort is a gain, and no reward is a loss compared
to the reference point.
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Figure 1: Self-sustaining goals and present-bias β. The dashed lines show the eﬀect of an
increase in loss aversion λ.
For any q ∈ (0, 1), for the goal to be self-sustaining, the agent must be willing
to randomize between eﬀort and no eﬀort. This requires the agent to be indiﬀerent.
Combining (1) and (2), the agent is indiﬀerent for q = q˜ where:
q˜ ≡ c(1 + ηλ)− βv(1 + η)
η(λ− 1)(c+ βv) . (3)
Note that q˜ = 1 for β = cv
(1+η)
(1+ηλ) ≡ β1, and q˜ = 0 for β =
c
v
(1+ηλ)
(1+η) ≡ β0. Thus,
β0 provides an upper bound for which e = 0 is sustainable, and β1 provides a lower
bound for which e = 1 is sustainable. It is easy to see that β0 > β1 for γ > 1.
Proposition 1 For any given goal, if β < β
1
the unique self-sustaining goal is not
to exert eﬀort, σ˜ = (1, 0); if β > β0, the unique self-sustaining goal is to exert eﬀort,
σ˜ = (0, 1); and if β ∈ [β
1
, β0], three self-sustaining goals exist: both pure strategy
σ˜ = (0, 1) and σ˜ = (1, 0) and a mixed strategy one σ˜ = (1− q˜, q˜), where q˜ is given by
(3).
The solid lines in Figure 1 illustrate the result. There is a simple intuition for why
there is a range of multiple equilibria. A loss averse person weighs the losses more
heavily than gains. If the goal is to exert eﬀort, the reference point is to incur the cost
of eﬀort c and then get the reward v. The loss from not exerting eﬀort would be in not
getting the reward, and this loss, if unexpected, would outweigh the unexpected gain
11
from lower disutility of eﬀort. On the other hand, if, for the same parameters, the
goal is not to exert eﬀort, the reference point is to incur no cost and get no reward.
The loss from exerting unexpected eﬀort would outweigh the unexpected gain. Easy
comparative statics shows that the more loss averse the agent is, the larger is the
interval for which there are multiple equilibria, as illustrated by the dashed lines in
figure 1 which correspond to a higher value of λ.
The foregoing argument also explains why the q˜−curve is downward sloping. A
higher q˜ or β both make eﬀort more attractive. To keep the agent indiﬀerent between
eﬀort and no eﬀort, q˜ must be lower for higher β.
3.2 Choice of eﬀort with endogenous goal setting
Now suppose the agent can set his own goal. We focus on pure strategies, as it is
easy to show that mixed strategies are never better10. Let e∗t denote the optimal
(not necessarily self-sustaining) pure-strategy goal from date t perspective. The ref-
erence point part drops out with pure strategies and self-sustaining goals, and one
immediately gets the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (optimal goals) e∗0 = 1 if and only if v ≥ c, and e∗1 = 1 if and only if
βv ≥ c.
Since we assumed that c < v, date-0 self would like to set e∗0 = 1. Note that
β
1
< cv < β0 for λ > 1. If β ∈ [0, β1), date-0 self’s preferred goal e
∗
0 = 1 is not self-
sustaining. If β ∈ [β
1
, c/v), despite the conflict of interest between date-0 and date-1
selves (e∗0 = 1 and e
∗
1 = 0), by setting goal e˜ = 1 the agent can induce herself to exert
eﬀort at date 1 (in the equilibrium which is optimal from date-0 perspective): in our
terminology there is eﬀective goal setting in this range of parameters. If β ≥ c/v
there is no conflict of interest at diﬀerent periods: e∗0 = 1 and e∗1 = 1.
Proposition 2 (i) Eﬀective goal-setting in which e˜ = 1 occurs for β ∈ [β
1
, c/v), and
(ii) β
1
is decreasing in λ and η with β
1
= cv < 1 if λ = 1 and β1 → 0 as λ→∞.
10To prove this, note that for any self-sustaining goal q˜ ∈ (0, 1), U0((1− q˜, q˜)|(1 − q˜, q˜)) = q˜(v −
c)− q˜(1− q˜)(λ− 1)η(v + c). Clearly, since v ≥ c, U0((1− q˜, q˜)|(1− q˜, q˜)) < v − c = U0((0, 1)|(0, 1)).
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The shaded area (I) on Figure 2 illustrates eﬀective goal setting for diﬀerent
combinations of β and λ. Two aspects are in particular noteworthy. First, it is the
interaction of loss aversion and present-biased discounting that drives the result. For
if either β = 1 or λ = 1 (or η = 0), generically there is no eﬀective goal setting.
When a person is not loss averse he or she evaluates the eﬀort decision the same way
independent of the goal set. Hence, there is no range with multiple equilibria, β
1
= β0,
and goal setting cannot be eﬀective. On the other hand, as the degree of loss aversion
λ (or the weight of the reference-dependent component of the utility function η)
becomes arbitrarily large, eﬀective goal-setting becomes possible for arbitrarily small
discount factors β.
Furthermore, for the range of eﬀective goalsetting, the agent achieves first best
behavior from the ex ante point of view: the agent is induced to choose e = 1 at date
1 and the reference-dependent component of the utility function is 0. Outside the
range of eﬀective goalsetting, the model predicts the same behavior as if there were
no reference point (η = 0): e = 1 if βv > c. Note that in this simple deterministic
setting a higher degree of loss aversion (or a larger weight of the reference-dependent
component) allows to overcome self-control problems with stronger present bias in
intertemporal preferences (since it increases oﬀ-equilibrium losses from deviation)
and, importantly, implies no utility loss on the equilibrium path. Of course, as our
analysis in Section 5 shows, in a more realistic stochastic setting this is no longer true:
stronger loss aversion expands the range of implementable goals, but also increases
losses in reference-dependent part of utility on the equilibrium path.
Discussion The main conclusion we would like to draw so far is that loss aversion
can help to overcome self-control problems associated with hyperbolic discounting.
Despite its apparent ineﬃciency, loss aversion may thus have some evolutionary value.
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2008) derive a very similar result in the context of consump-
tion plans. Their starting point is diﬀerent: they assume that people have preferences
over changes in beliefs, and that these preferences exhibit loss aversion with respect
to good and bad news — bad news is more unpleasant than good news is pleasant.
13
λβ
vc /
1
1
I
II
Figure 2: Eﬀective goalsetting. Area I shows the range of eﬀective goalsetting for diﬀerent
values of loss aversion λ and present bias β. Area II shows how the range of eﬀective
goalsetting expands with self-rewards.
Interestingly, that approach turns out to be analytically equivalent to the one in
this paper. They show that in a simple consumption model, the optimal consump-
tion path with the same consumption level in every period is not attainable, unless
loss aversion is strong enough — in which case the optimal consumption plan is time
consistent.
The self control mechanism in our model is entirely internal. By contrast, most
of the other literature has focused on external commitment devices. Strategies might
include commitment to contracts, making intentions public, or delegating authority
to others. However, as Schelling (1984, p. 2) notes, "most of the tactics used to
command one’s own future performance probably do not depend on someone else’s
participation." An exception is the insightful paper by Bénabou and Tirole (2004)
who also focus on internal commitments. In their analysis reputation building plays
a crucial role, in combination with imperfect self-knowledge. In our view, our models
are complementary.
Besides that, we also believe that we add an insight to the psychology literature.
There is a vast literature in psychology on goal setting, and its relation to motivation
and self-control. It is postulated that goals are an important regulator of eﬀort.
Baumeister et al. (1994) underline the importance of goals as being a prerequisite in
eﬀective self-regulation. Locke and Latham (1990) summarize numerous experiments
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that study the impact of goals on motivation, and find important eﬀects. Our model
provides one possible explanation of the causal eﬀect of goals on motivation in terms
of multiple equilibria: choosing the right goal can bring a person to an eﬃcient
intrapersonal equilibrium.
4 Self Rewards and Indulgence
Casual observation suggests many people engage in one or more forms of self-control.
Paradoxically, it seems that the very same individuals trying to exercise self-control
at the same time deliberately also engage in self-indulgent behavior. Those on a diet
regularly treat themselves on a chocolate bar after depriving themselves, others go
shopping after homework, get a pampering massage, or go out for a sumptuous meal
after finishing a tiresome project at the oﬃce. We conjecture most readers are familiar
with the idea of buying something you wouldn’t "normally" buy for yourself. In this
section we show that indulging can be an integral part of exercising self-control.
We now subdivide period 1 into two subperiods. In the first subperiod the agent
chooses the eﬀort level. In the second subperiod the agent decides to take a bonus
or not. We assume that there is no discounting between these two subperiods (this
assumption simplifies formulae without loss of generality). In period 0, the agent sets
a goal in terms of eﬀort and forms expectations about getting the bonus. We assume
that expectations about getting the bonus can be made contingent on the choice of
eﬀort. In particular, the agent can set as goal to exert eﬀort, and form expectations
to take the bonus after eﬀort only. If at date 1 the agent decides not to exert eﬀort,
then he updates his beliefs about getting the bonus in the second subperiod, and will
not expect a bonus. This eﬀectively ties the bonus to eﬀort.
Our focus will be on the case where goalsetting by itself is not suﬃcient to elimi-
nate the self-control problem, that is β < β
1
.Otherwise the bonus will not be essential
for convincing self-1 to exert eﬀort: self-0 may still use a bonus that is tied to eﬀort,
but eﬀorts can be sustained even without the bonus so that the bonus does not ef-
fectively solve the self-control problem. In fact, in that case the bonus would only
be used (in the equilibrium optimal for self-0) if self-0 liked to get the bonus anyway
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independent of eﬀort.
We consider a bonus that yields a direct payoﬀ b to the agent at t = 1, at cost
γb incurred at t = 2. Indeed, if a person is not facing liquidity problems, then by
buying a luxury good she deprives herself of some resources that would be available
for future consumption. We also assume that self-0 has some control over the size of
the bonus by choosing the level of γ; the cost-benefit ratio. We can think of diﬀerent
values of γ as characterizing diﬀerent kinds of gifts — more or less extravagant. We
impose a natural constraint γ ≥ 1 that captures the idea that the bonus is costly;
the following proposition shows, however, that this constraint is not binding. Self-0
can select the appropriate type of gift. The fact that the agent should take the bonus
only if she has planned to do it (i.e. she has exerted eﬀort) imposes some constraints
on the cost-benefit ratio γ: not any bonus will do. The following result shows that
the optimal bonus is one that self-0 would prefer not to receive if it were not required
for creating incentives to exert eﬀort.
Proposition 3 (i) The optimal cost-benefit ratio of the bonus is given by γ∗ =
1+η
β(1+ηλ) , and (ii) The expected net payoﬀ from getting the optimal bonus is negative
from date-0 perspective and positive from date-1 perspective: 1 < γ∗ < 1β .
Proof. The beliefs set by self-0 about getting the bonus, must have some impact
on the behavior of self-1. If self-1 would either always or never take the bonus no
matter what were expected, then the bonus could not help to overcome the self-control
problem. As with exerting eﬀort, there is a range of parameters for which there are
multiple self-sustaining equilibria. This is the case for γ ∈
h
1+η
β(1+ηλ) ,
1+ηλ
β(1+η)
i
. Since self-
0 wants to minimize the costs of the bonus, part 1 follows: the optimal γ∗ is the lower
bound of the interval of feasible values. Since we focus on β < β
1
= cv
1+η
1+ηλ <
1+η
1+ηλ , it
follows that γ∗ = 1+ηβ(1+ηλ) > 1. Finally, βγ
∗ = 1+η
(1+ηλ) < 1.
Part 1 shows that the optimal cost-benefit ratio of the bonus is decreasing in β, η,
and λ. A higher value of β reduces the self-control problem, and can reduce the costs
of the bonus. Higher values of λ and η make the person more loss averse, increasing
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the scope of multiple equilibria, so that the bonus can be eﬀective at lower values of
γ.
The second part shows that the bonus is costly: self-0 would prefer not to take the
bonus if not for creating incentives for self-1. So far we have shown that an eﬀective
bonus must be costly. We now show that eﬀective bonuses indeed do exist and self-0
can use them to overcome the self-control problem. By conditioning the bonus on
exerting eﬀort, self-0 can convince self-1 to exert eﬀort. The strategy of self-0 will
therefore be to set e˜ = 1 as the goal, and to expect the bonus if e = 1 and not
otherwise. For this to be an optimal and credible strategy, some conditions have to
be fulfilled.
With the optimal bonus, self-1 will take the bonus only if expected, hence only
after choosing e = 1. Exerting eﬀort becomes more attractive than without the bonus:
it can be sustained if β (1+ηλ)
(1+η) +
b
v (1− βγ)
1
1+η ≥
c
v . Substituting for γ
∗, we find that
e = 1 is sustainable for:
β ≥ c
v
1 + η
1 + ηλ
− b
v
η(λ− 1)
(1 + ηλ)2
≡ βb
1
. (4)
Note in particular thatβb
1
< β
1
, so that e = 1 is sustainable for a larger set of
parameters than without a bonus. Even if this condition is satisfied, however, self-0
may be better oﬀ by setting e˜ = 0 and never expecting a bonus since γ∗ > 1. Self-0
is better oﬀ with the target e˜ = 1 and expecting a bonus if e = 1 if
β ≥
µ
1 + η
1 + ηλ
¶µ
b
v − c+ b
¶
. (5)
Whether (5) or (4) is binding depends on the specific parameters. At λ = 1, (4) is
the relevant lower bound provided b < c, but for larger values of λ, (5) may become
binding.11
Proposition 4 (i) If λ > 1, an ex ante costly bonus b can help to overcome self-
control problems for some values of β if and only if b < c, and (ii) the lower bound
of values of β is decreasing in λ.
11To be precise, if (v−c)(c−b)b(V−c+b) <
1
1+n , then (5) becomes binding for a suﬃciently large value of λ.
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Proof. Part (i). If b ≥ c, then bV−c+b ≥
c
v and thus there can be no value of β
satisfying (5) and β < β
1
. On the other hand, if b < c, then cv >
b
V−c+b so there
always exist values of β satisfying (5) and β < β
1
. Also, the right-hand side of (4)
is strictly lower than β
1
, so there always exist values of β satisfying (4) and β < β
1
.
Part (ii). Both (4) and (5) are decreasing in λ, hence so is the maximum of the two.
This result is illustrated in Figure 2. Area (II) between the dashed line and the
shaded area of eﬀective goalsetting is where bonuses are eﬀective and desired. Since
a bonus is costly, a larger bonus can make a person only better oﬀ for higher values
of β, as the optimal cost-benefit ratio of the bonus decreases in β. When b ≥ c the
minimum required β exceeds β1.
Discussion Based on survey evidence, Mick and Demoss (1990) conclude that per-
sonal accomplishments and achieved goals are important reasons to reward oneself.
According to them, "self gifts can act as self contracts in which the reciprocity for
the gift is eﬀort and achievement" (Mick and Demoss 1990, p. 326). These gifts often
have an indulgence character. A saying illustration of indulgence is a respondent who
reported to purchase "things I would not normally buy myself" after quitting smoking
(Mick and Demoss, 1990 p. 327). Kivetz and Simonson (2002) provide some further
evidence, and conclude that consumers are more likely to prefer luxury goods after
completing an eﬀortful task. They argue that pleasurable consumption arises from
"earning the right to indulge through hard work". While this evidence is suggestive,
it raises the question how indulgence can be made contingent on eﬀort, instead of
always buying the good. Why is it that under normal circumstances one would not
by the good? Our model provides a reason why such a contingent strategy is enforce-
able. It also gives an exact content to the idea of buying goods a person would not
normally buy him/herself.
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5 Uncertainty
So far we abstracted away from the uncertainty. More realistically, goals are set when
there is still some uncertainty about the nature of the task, such as how much eﬀort
is needed for completion, or what are the prospects of success. When news arrives,
a wrongly set goal may magnify the problem. Extra losses may result from either
conforming to the unrealistic goal or from deviating from the goal.
In this section we introduce some uncertainty. Uncertainty is only relevant for
goalsetting if the eﬀort decision is possibly sensitive to any new information. Thus,
while there might be uncertainty about the rewards, this is of less interest if the
information is received after the eﬀort decision. Instead, we focus on uncertainty
about the cost of eﬀort, which may reflect the diﬃculty of the task. Suppose disutility
can be either cl or ch > cl. The probability that disutility is low is ρ. The costs are
unknown at the goal-setting stage, but are revealed prior to the eﬀort decision.
Denote by (ql, qh) the strategy profile of the agent, where ql denotes the probability
of working after cl, and qh denotes the probability of working after ch. Let qˆi denote
the probability of working such that an agent is indiﬀerent between working and
not working after observing ci. Clearly it cannot be the case that both qˆl ∈ (0, 1)
and qˆh ∈ (0, 1), and neither that qˆh > qˆl. Hence, in addition to (ql, qh) = (0, 0) and
(ql, qh) = (1, 1), we can have (ql, qh) = (qˆl, 0) with (see the proof to proposition 5 in
the appendix for derivations):
qˆl =
cl(1 + ηλ)− βv(1 + η)
η(λ− 1)(cl + βv)ρ
, (6)
or (ql, qh) = (1, qˆh) with:
qˆh =
cH(1 + ηλ)− βv(1 + η)− η(λ− 1)ρ(cL + βv)
η(λ− 1)(cH + βv)(1− ρ)
. (7)
Again we restrict analysis to pure strategies, as mixed strategies never do better.
The above equations determine four relevant threshold levels, β00, β10, β10, β11, where
βqi,qj denotes the threshold value such that strategy (qi, qj) is sustainable, and the bar
indicates whether it is an upper bound or a lower bound. Likewise, one can derive
threshold levels for when strategy (qi, qj) is preferred. Let v1 denote indiﬀerence
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between (1, 0) and (0, 0), v2 between (1, 1) and (0, 0), and v3 between (1, 1) and (1, 0)
(these thresholds, independent of β, are derived in the Appendix).
We are particularly interested in how uncertainty can lead to a situation in which
optimal goals are rigid, seemingly dysfunctional. Specifically, we show that there are
cases where the agents never works even if v ≥ βv > cl. In that case, the agent
never works although eﬀort after cl is desirable in terms of direct payoﬀs from the
perspective of every date. Similarly, we show that there are cases where the agent
always works even though ch > v ≥ βv. With some abuse of terminology we refer
to these two cases as underdiligence and overdiligence. Rather than characterizing
all possible equilibria for diﬀerent parameter configurations, we focus on those two
interesting cases.
Figure 3 below illustrates a situation with both types of dysfunctional goals. Equi-
librium strategies are indicated in some areas, with an asterisk in case it is a preferred
equilibrium. In area I there is underdiligence. v ≤ v1 so the agent prefers never to
work. This equilibrium is sustainable as β ≤ β00. And since βv ≥ cl, it satisfies the
conditions for an overly rigid goal. Very similar remarks apply for area II, in which
there is overdiligence. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) derive a similar result in a context
without hyperbolic discounting, and indeed overly rigid goals exist for β = 1. Figure
3 shows how this result interacts with lower values of β. Note in particular that there
are cases for which no overly rigid goals exist for β = 1, but do exist for lower values
of β as in area III.
The reason behind the existence of overly rigid goals can be understood as follows.
Consider area I, the situation in which there is underdiligence. When costs are low,
there is a merit of exerting eﬀort in terms of direct payoﬀs. Compared to never
exerting eﬀort, this shifts the reference points towards expecting eﬀorts with a positive
probability (if cost realizations happen to be low). This creates stochastic goals,
implying deviations from the goal on the equilibrium path, hence — associated utility
losses. To see this more clearly, considered the expected utility from exerting eﬀort
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Figure 3: Under and overdiligence. Underdiligence arises in area I, overdiligence in area
II.
after low costs (when the goal is (1,0)). It is given by:
ρ[−cl + v| {z }
(1)
+ (1− ρ)(−ηλcl + ηv)]| {z }
(2)
+ (1− ρ)ρ(ηcl − ηλv)| {z }
(3)
, (8)
The first eﬀect, occurring with probability ρ, is the direct payoﬀ from exerting
eﬀort and is positive by construction. If costs are low, that might be a deviation
from the reference point. With probability 1− ρ, no eﬀort was expected so exerting
eﬀort brings higher disutility costs and rewards than expected. This is the second
term, which might be positive or negative depending on λ. If costs are high, no eﬀort
is exerted but some eﬀort was expected with probability ρ, in which case disutility
costs and rewards are lower than expected. This is the third term, and this is negative
since in area I v > cl. By contrast, if the agent never exerts eﬀort there is never a
deviation from the reference point.
Seemingly dysfunctional goal setting only happens for λ > 1. For λ = 1, the upper
bound for which never to exert eﬀort is sustainable (β00) coincides with βv = cl,
and the lower bound for which always to exert eﬀort is sustainable (β11) coincides
with βv = ch. As λ increases, there is more room for dysfunctional goals. Both
the β00−curve and v1 shift to the right, as is easy to show. Likewise, β11 and v2
shift leftward. It will be clear that for some λ, v1 = v2 = v3 and the agent is
indiﬀerent between all three strategies (0, 0), (1, 0), and (1, 1). For any higher value
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of λ, the strategy (1, 0) is always dominated, so the relevant question is whether or
not (1, 1) is preferred to (0, 0). In the appendix we prove that if λ it is suﬃciently high,
then never exerting eﬀort is always sustainable and preferred for any v ∈ [cl, ch]. The
next proposition summarizes these results. Define λ∗ ≡ max
n
1 + 1η(1−ρ) ,
ch
cl
1+η
η −
1
η
o
,
then:
Proposition 5 Underdiligence exists for some v ∈ [cl, ch] if and only if λ > 1, with
β ≤ max{β00, 1}, where β00 decreases in v; overdiligence exists for some v ∈ [cl, ch]
if and only if λ∗ > λ > 1, with β ≥ β
11
, where β11 decreases in v.
Proof. See Appendix.
6 Proximal and Distal Goals
By focusing on the simple decision to exert eﬀort or not in a single period, we bypassed
an important theme in the psychology literature. This concerns the question wether
goals should be proximal or distal (Locke and Latham, 1990; Baumeister et al., 1994).
That is, is it better to split the task up in small portions, such as weekly or monthly
targets, or to set one single goal at the end of the project? This is essentially a question
about flexibility. Proximal goals, if eﬀective, induce greater commitments to take
many small steps, eventually resulting in reaching overall success. But distal goals
allow greater flexibility, and hence more responsiveness to unforeseen or uncertain
shocks. Under distal goals, any absence due to illness or the interference of another
more pressing task can be absorbed by working harder on other days.
Overall, the evidence whether proximal or distal goals are better is mixed (Baumeis-
ter et al., 1994). It is an open question how these data may be organized to account
for the conflicting results. We believe that one natural way to pursue this question,
is to relate the choice of proximal or distal goals to the distribution of shocks over
time. Intuitively, distal goals allow for the absorption of an illness only if the illness
does not persist over the complete time horizon.
We address the trade-oﬀ between proximal and distal goals by considering a simple
extension to the main model with uncertainty. We subdivide period 1 in two distinct
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periods, 1a and 1b. The task is such that two units of eﬀort are needed to complete it.
The agent can either exert 1 unit of eﬀort in every period, or both in one subperiod. If
the agents exerts two units of eﬀort in one period, total disutility is 2ψc, with ψ ≥ 1.
One unit of eﬀort in a subperiod gives costs c. Thus, at each date costs of eﬀort is
a convex function, so spreading eﬀort is less costly. As in the previous section, costs
are uncertain and can be either low or high each period. We assume this time that
the task has to be completed (not competing implies excessively high costs upon the
agent). This will greatly reduce the number of possible cases.
The following definition conceptualizes proximal and distal goals in a precise man-
ner.
Definition 2 A proximal goal is such that e1a = e1b = 1 for any cost realization c1a.
A distal goal is such that (i) e1a = e1b = 1 if c1a = cL and (ii) e1a = 0 and e1b = 2 if
c1a = cH.
By this definition, distal goals are more flexible and responsive to costs than the
rigid proximal goals. They do not dictate to exert eﬀort in period 1b under all circum-
stances. This flexibility has its obvious benefits. The downside is that concentrating
all eﬀorts in one single period is assumed to be more costly than spreading eﬀorts at
any given costs as ψ ≥ 1.
Of course, the first question is under which conditions any of the two strategies is
feasible as an equilibrium strategy. But the expressions are tedious and are not our
primary interest here. Rather, we would like to know which strategy the agent would
choose in the event that both strategies are available to her. When only one or none
type of strategies are optimal the choice is trivial.
What type of goal is better depends crucially on the correlation of shocks over
time. It is insightful to consider the two extreme opposites of perfect positively
correlated shocks and perfect negatively correlated shocks. Both these extremes have
a useful interpretation. Perfect positively correlated shocks can for instance reflect
ability of the agents for the task, which can either be high or low but is presumably
relatively constant over the course of completion. On the other hand, when other
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obligations get in between, this will raise the costs of doing the task. Perhaps the
agent knows that another task has to be completed during the same time interval
as the current task, but is unsure about whether this has to be done in the first or
second subperiod. This yields a perfect negative correlation of shocks over time.
Proposition 6 Let proximal and distal goal be equilibrium strategies. Then, (i) if
costs are perfect positively correlated over periods, proximal goals are preferred for
any ψ ≥ 1; (ii) if costs are perfect negatively correlated over periods proximal goals
are preferred for ψ ≥ ψ¯(cH , cL, λ), and distal goals otherwise, with ψ¯(·) increasing in
cH and decreasing in cL and λ.
When costs are perfect negatively correlated, distal goals sometimes do better
than proximal goals under our assumptions. Distal goals are more flexible, and pre-
vent incurring high costs in the first period. The downside are the higher costs of
concentrating all eﬀort in one period, and this is worse for higher values of ψ. The
critical value ψ¯ beneath which distal goals are preferred, increases in cH and decreases
in cL. This is intuitive, since if the diﬀerence in costs is large, postponing after high
costs and exert eﬀort when costs are low becomes more beneficial. If∆ ≡ cH−cL → 0,
a rough measure of the uncertainty level, proximal goals are preferred for any ψ ≥ 1.
A higher degree of loss aversion λ makes the deviations from the reference point
more costly, which makes proximal goals more attractive for lower values of ψ since
proximal goals have less extreme deviations from the reference point.
When costs are positively correlated, the flexibility of distal goals loses its bite.
The agent postpones exerting eﬀort after high costs, but when shocks are positively
correlated, costs will also be high in the next period. Thus, postponing only results
in even higher costs. In this case, proximal goals are always better for any ψ ≥ 1.
7 Discussion and conclusions
Building on an extensive literature in psychology, we proposed a formal model that
explains why goalsetting can be a credible and eﬀective strategy of self-regulation.
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We also demonstrated that this can explain some well-known forms of apparently
irrational behavior, such as indulgent behavior and dysfunctional goals.
There are several interesting extensions of our model we plan to pursue in future
research. One possible direction is to examine the relationship between external and
internal commitment strategies: we focused on internal strategies, but in practice
this approach has its limitations. The model can be extended to include external
commitment strategies, and can be used to analyze the interaction.
We also plan to extend the model to explain systematic deviations from goals. It
appears goals are often set unrealistically optimistic. For instance, DellaVigna and
Malmendier (2006) find that many members of the gym club overestimate attendance
and end up paying more per visit in monthly fees than they would have had to pay
using per visit fees. Burger and Lynham (2006) study individuals that place bets on
loosing a certain amount of weight, and find that the vast majority loses their bet.
Future work could shed light on this, by weakening the strong requirement of rational
expectations, or otherwise.
8 Appendix
Proof of proposition 5. We first derive the threshold levels given in equations (6) and
(7). Consider the strategy (ql, 0), hence never eﬀort when costs are high, and eﬀort
with probability ql when costs are low. At t = 1, e = 0 after low costs gives utility:
ρql(ηcl − ηλβv), (9)
whereas e = 1 yields:
−cl + βv + ρ(1− ql)(−ηλcl + ηβv) + (1− ρ)(−ηλcl + ηβv). (10)
Equation (6) follows from indiﬀerence, thus equating the two above expressions. For
any ql < qˆl, (0,0) is preferred, while for any ql > qˆl, (1,1) is preferred. Hence, (0,0)
can be sustained as long as qˆl ≥ 0, or:
β ≤ β00 ≡
cl
v
1 + ηλ
1 + η
, (11)
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and (1,1) can be sustained as long as qˆl ≤ 1, or:
β ≥ β
10
≡ cl
v
1 + ηλ− ρη(λ− 1)
1 + η + ρη(λ− 1) . (12)
Similarly, given strategy (1, qh), e = 0 after high costs gives:
ρ(ηcl − ηλβv) + (1− ρ)qh(ηch − ηλβv), (13)
while e = 1 yields:
−ch + βv + ρ(−ηλ(ch − cl)) + (1− ρ)(1− qh)(−ηλch + ηβv). (14)
From the above two equations, equation (7) follows. Hence, (1,0) can be sustained
as long as qˆh ≥ 0, or:
β ≤ β10 ≡
1
v
ch(1 + ηλ)− clρη(λ− 1)
1 + η + ρη(λ− 1) , (15)
and (1,1) can be sustained as long as qˆh ≤ 1, or:
β ≥ β
11
≡ 1
v
ch(1 + η + ρη(λ− 1))− clρη(λ− 1)
1 + ηλ
. (16)
From the perspective at t = 0, the epxected utility of (0,0) is zero, the expected
utility of (1,0) is:
ρ[−cl + v + (1− ρ)(−ηλcl + ηv)] + (1− ρ)ρ[ηcl − ηλv], (17)
and of (1,1):
ρ[−cl + v + (1− ρ)(−η(cl − ch))] + (1− ρ)[−ch + v + ρ(−ηλ(ch − cl))]. (18)
If (1−ρ)η(λ−1) ≥ 1, (0,0) is always preferred to (1,0), and if (1−ρ)η(λ−1) < 1,
(0,0) is preferred to (1,0) if:
v ≤ v1 ≡ cl
1 + (1− ρ)η(λ− 1)
1− (1− ρ)η(λ− 1) . (19)
(1,1) is preferred to (1,0) if:
v ≥ v2 ≡ ch − 2cl
ρη(λ− 1)
1 + ρη(λ− 1) , (20)
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and (1,1) is preferred to (0,0) if:
v ≥ v3 ≡ ρcl + (1− ρ)ch + ρ(1− ρ)η(λ− 1)(ch − cl). (21)
The following facts are easy to verify. First, if λ = 1, β00 = cl/v, β11 = ch/v,
v1 = cl, and v2 = ch. Furthermore, β00 and v1 are increasing in λ, and β11 and v2 are
decreasing in λ. Thus, as λ ↓ 1, v1 < v2 and it is always possible to find a region with
both under- and overdiligence, as in figure 3. As λ→ 1+1/(η(1−ρ)), v1 →∞, so for
some λ < 1 + 1/(η(1− ρ)), v1 = v2 = v3. (1,0) is then always dominated by (0,0) for
any larger λ. Comparing (0,0) and (1,1), note that v3 is increasing in λ, and v3 = ch
for λ = 1 + 1/(η(1 − ρ)). Also, β00 ≥ 1 at v = ch if λ ≥ (ch/cl)(1 + η)/η − 1/η, in
which case (0,0) is sustainable for any v ∈ [cl, ch] and any β.
Now, if max1 + 1η(1−ρ) ≥
ch
cl
1+η
η −
1
η , then λ
∗ = 1 + 1η(1−ρ) . In that case, if λ < λ
∗
then v3 < ch and (1,1) is preferred for v ∈ (v3, ch] and sustainable for some values
of β. If 1 + 1η(1−ρ) <
ch
cl
1+η
η −
1
η , then λ
∗ = chcl
1+η
η −
1
η . In that case, if λ < λ
∗ then
β00 < 1 and (0,0) cannot be sustained for some values of β. As long as λ > 1, (1,1) is
the equilibrium strategy for some values of β. On the other hand, whenever λ ≥ λ∗,
(0, 0) is preferred to any other strategy for any v ∈ [cl, ch] and sustainable for any β
in that range.
Proof of proposition 6. Consider first perfect positively correlated costs. Com-
paring ex ante expected utility at t = 0, it is straightforward to derive that proximal
goals yield higher utility if:
ψ ≥ 1−
∙
ρη(λ− 1)
1 + ρη(λ− 1)
¸
cL
cH
.
The RHS is smaller than 1, so this is satisfied for any ψ ≥ 1. If costs are perfect
negatively correlated, proximal goals yield higher utility if:
ψ ≥ cH + cL + 3(cH − cL)ρη(λ− 1)
2cL(1 + ρη(λ− 1))
.
It is easy to verify that the RHS is increasing in cH and decreasing in cL and λ.
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